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Abstract
Germany’s complete overhaul of the telecommunications legislation seeks to ensure easy ac-
cess to the German market and a level playing field for all, based on regulation that is independent
and quick to intervene against any abuse of market power, in other words to ensure a sound and
predictable investment climate. Our regulation aims to promote competition in the telecommuni-
cations sector and to encourage technological and organizational progress at the same time. This
policy stands to benefit all: customers, Deutsche Telekom AG, new entrants, the workforce, Ger-
many as a place to do business, and the prospects of the German economy generally. The World
Trade Organization estimates that a quarter of all economic activity in the industrial countries will
be accounted for in the future by electronic commerce. Germany is preparing itself for these global
challenges and has already made a promising start.
IV. INDUSTRIES IN THE PROCESS OF DE-
REGULATION
1. TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PRICE CONTROL AND OTHER
REGULATORY ISSUES
Helmut Schadow*
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE
GERMAN TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR
On January 1, 1998 the final provisions of the Telecommu-
nications Act of July 25, 19961 ("Telecommunications Act" or
"TKG") became effective, leading to the full liberalization of the
telecommunications market. This legislation was the final stage
in the complete restructuring of the German telecommunica-
tions sector; in the postal service, the monopoly on letter mail
items weighing less than 200 grams remains until 2002. In tan-
dem with European Community ("EC" or "Community") policy,
the former state monopolies have therefore now been almost en-
tirely lifted and the postal and telecommunications markets
opened to competition.
Posts and telecommunications reform in Germany has
taken place in three stages. Stage one, the 1989 Postreform I,
separated the sovereign tasks of the state from the operational
and entrepreneurial functions, lifted the monopoly on telecom-
munications terminal equipment, and opened the satellite and
mobile communications markets to competition. The second
posts and telecommunications package, Postreform II (January
1, 1995), transformed the three enterprises (Telekom, Post, and
Postbank) into stock corporations. At the same time, the addi-
tion of Article 87(f) to the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz, made the
admission and promotion of competition a constitutional re-
* Head of Section 121, German Regulatory Authority on Telecommunications and
Postal Services.
1. Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG), v. 1.8.1996 (BGBI. I S.1120) [hereinafter
Telecommunications Act].
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quirement. 2 This provision specifies that the Federation guaran-
tee appropriate and adequate telecommunications and postal
services throughout the country, to be provided by Deutsche
Telekom AG and Deutsche Post AG as well as other private oper-
ators on a private enterprise basis. The third stage was then used
to abolish the monopoly on voice telephony and on the opera-
tion and use of telecommunications networks.
What follows in this Essay will refer solely to the telecommu-
nication sector. A complete overhaul of the telecommunications
legislation was required in order that the new constitutional aims
could be implemented. Simply adding to the previous arrange-
ments3 would not have been sufficient.
It hardly needs mentioning that the impetus for amending
the German telecommunications legislation did not come from
German reform policy alone. Rather, the Telecommunications
Act came into being as a result of the sector-specific telecommu-
nications policy of the Community, in which the federal govern-
ment was an active player. The essence of the Telecommunica-
tions Act was therefore already set forth. In its July 22, 1993 Res-
olution to liberalize all public voice telephony services by
January 1, 1998, 4 and its December 22, 1994 Resolution to liber-
alize telecommunications infrastructures,5 the Council of Eu-
rope ("Council") thus laid down the principles that would un-
derpin Member States' national law as well as future Community
policy. Thus, the basis is formed by Council Directive 90/387/
EEC of June 28, 1990 on the establishment of the internal mar-
ket for telecommunications services through the implementa-
tion of open network provision6 and Commission Directive 90/
388/EEC of June 28, 1990 on competition in the markets for
telecommunications services.7
Over the last few years, other directives have been issued in
order to implement the rulings in these two directives about
opening the telecommunications markets to competition. It
2. Cf the section-by-section analysis of the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP of the draft
Telecommunications Act, Bundestag printed paper 13/3609, 33.
3. See Telecommunication Installations Act (FAG), v. 17.3.1977 (BGBI. I S.459);
Telecommunications and Posts Regulation Act, v. 14.9.1994 (BGBI. I. S.2325, 2371).
4. Council Resolution of 22 July 1993, O.J. C 213/1 (1993).
5. Council Resolution of 22 December 1994, O.J. C 379/4 (1994).
6. Council Resolution of 28 June 1990, O.J. L 192/1 (1990).
7. Council Directive No. 90/387/EEC, O.J. L 192/10 (1990).
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would exceed, however, the scope of this Essay to cite, even as
examples, more than a few of the fundamental directives we are
familiar with from our daily work.8 As a Member State of the
European Union (or "EU"), the Federal Republic of Germany
has obligations arising from international treaties and constitu-
tional law that require it to transpose these directives into na-
tional law by a specified date and to refrain from any sovereign
action that would run counter to Community legal instruments.9
In all these directives it is envisioned that the EU Member
States notify the European Commission ("Commission") of their
transposition. In its Communication to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the
Committee of the Regions of May 29, 1997, before the enact-
ment of the provisions of the German Telecommunications Act
fully opening voice telephony to competition, the Commission
noted approvingly that the TKG provided a "broad framework
for the transposition of the whole telecommunications package."
Here, the Commission was referring not only to directives al-
ready issued at the time of the Communication but also to forth-
coming directives, the details of which were not yet finalized but
which, in essence, were already featured in the TKG.' °
Already, only one year since the fundamental rules liberaliz-
ing the market were enacted, the TKG has proved absolutely ro-
bust and has encouraged competition in the markets. An initial
assessment is highly positive in what it says:
The privatization and liberalization of the German tele-
communications and postal markets has begun successfully.
8. Particularly noteworthy are Directive 97/13/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council, Oj. L 117/15 (1997); Directive 97/33/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council, O.J. L 199/32 (1997); Directive 98/10/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, O.J. L 101/24 (1998).
9. Article 23(1) and Article 59 of the Basic Law; Treaty establishing the European
Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 189, O.J. C. 224/1, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573,
693 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU]. The
Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amended the Treaty establishing the Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by
Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987). [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA]; Id.
art 5, O.J. C 224/1, at 9 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
10. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee,
and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package, COM (97) 236 final, 14, 16 (May 1997).
2000] PRICE CONTROL AND OTHER REGULATORY ISSUES S125
The telecommunications market was fully opened to competi-
tion on 1 January 1998, the scheduled date; the start has been
highly positive, and exceeded all our expectations. To date,
around 170 licenses have been granted for fixed-line teleph-
ony and transmission lines; nearly 180 more are in the pipe-
line. And in the area that is not subject to license, there are
currently some 1,000 telecommunications service providers
operating. These figures show that companies are confident
about liberalization, and that they rate the opportunity to
generate profits on the newly deregulated markets very
highly. Thus competition is now, only months after the
launch of full competition, already intense. The licensee
structure is heterogeneous. Licensees comprise city opera-
tors, regional suppliers, companies offering service in one or
more states (laender), alongside various nationwide providers.
Around 70 cities and municipalities have already set up their
own telecommunications company, while another 50 are
planning to do so.
All in all, the new entrants achieved call volumes of
nearly 30 million minutes per day towards the end of the first
six months of 1998. For the most part, this was due to the
call-by-call procedure in which the customer dials a code to
access their chosen operator, on an one-off basis. In the long-
distance market the new entrants already have a share of
nearly 12 percent of total daily call minutes as a result of this
option. This success is also visible for the customer. Thus,
compared to the end of last year before the voice telephony
market was opened to competition, tariffs for long-distance
calls at peak periods (9 a.m. - 12 midday) on weekdays have
fallen for everyone (that is to say, when volume discounts are
excluded). 1
II. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
Accommodating constitutional and Community law, the
Telecommunications Act puts in place the legal framework, spe-
cifically for the telecommunication sector, needed to liberalize
the state monopolies previously held by an enterprise required
to provide nationwide service. It was on January 1, 1998 that
11. Regulierungsbehbrde ffir Telekommunikation und Post (Reg TP), Press Re-
lease 9 (July 15, 1998); see also German Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications &
Posts (visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.regtp.de/English.htm>.
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competition, and thus regulatory normality, finally became pos-
sible. If, however, market forces were left to prevail, then the
incumbents would hold all the trump cards.
Even after the withdrawal of its exclusive rights, Deutsche
Telekom AG, the former monopolist, had virtually 100% of the
market at the launch of competition. Another competitive ad-
vantage Deutsche Telekom AG has over its new rivals is that it is
the only company in Germany that has a nationwide, state-of-the-
art network serving almost forty million customers and nation-
wide facilities accessible over leased lines. 12 New entrants could
easily be kept out of the market not only by discriminatory pric-
ing but also by being denied interconnection with existing net-
works. And especially in the initial phase, new entrants rely on
the shared use of facilities, particularly at local levels.
The Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and
Posts (or "Regulatory Authority") was established to address is-
sues of telecommunications law deriving from the Telecommu-
nications Act in particular.'3 The regulatory role laid down by
the TKG is not an end in itself: without licensing, without ex-
ante regulation of interconnection charges, without state-guar-
anteed network access on fair terms and conditions, without the
ex-post control of retail prices, without dispute settlement by the
state, without frequency management and number management
by the state; in short without the Regulatory Authority, there
would not be efficient competition in the telecommunication
market.
The Regulatory Authority's tasks are set forth in the Tele-
communications Act. The aims of all its work can be subsumed
under four main headings:
1. Given the incumbent's dominant position, a level playing
field must be ensured.
2. There must be co-operation between rival providers in
terms of technical standards and specifications, and such
co-operation may not lead to discrimination of any kind.
3. The economic and technical framework must be adapted
to the current, state-of-the-art conditions and must be
12. Details from the section-by-section analysis of the CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP of
the draft Telecommunications Act, Bundestag printed paper 13/3609, 33.
13. Telecommunications Act, supra note 1, §66(1).
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open-ended, so as to foster further technological ad-
vance.
4. An appropriate and adequate supply of telecommunica-
tions services must be guaranteed throughout the coun-
try, as part of Community service requirements.
Hence, the aim is not to constrain entrepreneurial freedom, but,
on the contrary, to promote competition in the marketplace and
to encourage technological and organizational progress. The
creation of equal opportunity and efficient competition are also
keys to achieving other goals, for it is competition that best
serves users' interests, that allows technology to be advanced
more rapidly, and that delivers basic services most cost-effectively
and reliably in the long run.
III. POWERS
To enforce its aims, the Regulatory Authority has been
equipped with effective procedures and instruments including
information and investigative rights as well as a set of sanctions.
Under Section 72 of the Telecommunications Act, the Regula-
tory Authority can request information from companies engaged
in telecommunications, and inspect and audit their business
records. For this purpose, it has access to business premises dur-
ing normal business hours. It may undertake searches by local
court order and take into custody objects and business records.
Records not given voluntarily may be seized. A maximum ad-
ministrative fine of DM1 million may be stipulated in order to
enforce these orders or in the event of any violation against
them.
IV. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
Transparent, independent rulings are guaranteed first and
foremost by Ruling Chambers proceedings. The Ruling Cham-
bers are conciliation boards whose decisions are made, similar to
the judicial system, by a chairman and two assessors. The Presi-
dential Chamber is comprised of the President, as Chairman,
and the two Vice-Presidents as assessors when ruling on licensing
issues, the award of scarce frequency spectrum, and when requir-
ing companies to provide universal service. Ruling Chamber
Two's responsibility includes rate regulation for publicly avail-
able voice telephony and for transmission lines. Special control
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of anti-competitive practices and ex-post rates regulation in the
telecommunications marketplace has been assigned to Ruling
Chamber Three. And Ruling Chamber Four decides on matters
of special network access, including interconnection.
Proceedings are public; the companies directly involved
take part. Persons, associations of persons, or representatives of
business circles affected by the proceedings may be invited to
attend. Basing proceedings on the judicial system and recogniz-
ing the validity of procedural principles guarantees objective rul-
ings that are readily comprehensible to all parties.
Two administrative telecommunications departments com-
plement the work of the Ruling Chambers. Department One,
Telecommunications Regulation, is responsible for basic eco-
nomic and legal issues, licenses, and for frequency management.
Department Three, Technical Telecommunications Regulation,
is responsible for technical matters in relation to frequency as-
signment, licensing, standardization, testing, and measurements.
The ruling that Regulatory Authority decisions cannot be
quashed by the supervisory body, the Ministry of Economics and
Technology, is particularly important for the independence of
the Regulatory Authority. Action against Regulatory Authority
rulings may only be brought directly before the administrative
courts, whereby such appeals have no suspensory effect.14 This
structure is especially important to the work of the Ruling Cham-
bers on issues of rate regulation, ONP, and interconnection. Ac-
tion by the regulator in these areas can only be effective when it
is immediate and not delayed by protracted legal proceedings.
Time is of the essence, particularly with respect to competition
issues, a fact that has been taken into account by the lawmakers.
A party affected by regulatory action seeking to gain time must
apply for an administrative court order for suspensory effect, in
accordance with Section 80(5) of the Rules of the Administrative
Courts.
The Regulatory Authority is responsible for implementing
laws and related ordinances. Directorate Seven at the Econom-
ics Ministry is responsible for telecommunications and the postal
service, drafting proposals for new legislation, and the amend-
ment of existing legislation. Directorate Seven also represents
German interests in international bodies, including the EU. Par-
14. Id. § 80(2).
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ticularly on matters of market definition and market dominance,
the Regulatory Authority works closely with the Federal Cartel
Office, as prescribed by §82 of the Telecommunications Act.
Given the complexity of the issues, the two authorities may well
hold divergent opinions. If the positions cannot be reconciled,
even after an exchange of views has taken place, then the author-
ity with the relevant decision-making powers under the law has
the last word.
V. FIELDS OF ACTIVITY
There are four major fields of activity. These fields are mar-
ket entry and licensing, universal service, rates regulation, and
network access and interconnection. The following will outline
for each of these four areas the regulator's tasks and responsibili-
ties as derived from the legislation. Individual issues addressed
this year will then be described.
A. Market Entry and Licensing
In principle, anyone may offer service in the telecommuni-
cations market. The barriers for new entrants are kept to a mini-
mum by the Telecommunications Act. The subjective require-
ments for entrepreneurial activity in telecommunications are
limited to what is absolutely necessary in recognition of the
constitutional right of choice of occupation or profession. The
provisions of the Telecommunications Act that address licensing
awards, necessary under certain conditions before telecommuni-
cations services can be provided, but not present insurmount-
able barriers for a service provider. Requirements or special
conditions associated with license award are only permitted in
certain narrowly defined cases. 15 Otherwise, the Telecommuni-
cations Act relies largely on the self-regulating ability of the mar-
kets; additional regulatory intervention in the market is envis-
aged as a general rule in relation to dominant companies only.
A license is needed for the provision of mobile communica-
tions services, satellite communications services, for the opera-
tion of other transmission paths, and for voice telephony pro-
vided on the basis of self-operated networks. This requirement
means, for instance, that a company providing data or mul-
15. Id. § 8(2).
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timedia services over leased lines does not require a license. In
the areas where licenses are necessary, licenses are granted when
the applicant can evidence sufficient reliability, efficiency, and
specialized knowledge for their activity in the marketplace. An-
other safeguard is that public order and safety will not be endan-
gered by the intended activity.
Competitive bidding and auctions are held solely for the ra-
dio spectrum, on account of it being a scarce resource. By De-
cember 1998, some 320 licenses had been granted for fixed-line
voice telephony and transmission lines in the fixed network,
while around 200 were being processed. These figures show that
companies are confident about liberalization and that they rate
the chance of success highly. Competition in the newly deregu-
lated markets has achieved a pleasing level of intensity.
1. Additional Notes and Examples
In mobile communications, a decision is pending on the
award of spectrum still available in the 1800 MHz band for appli-
cations based on the GSM 1800 standard. Bids for frequency
assignment have been received from the two operators, DI and
D2. Under the provisions of the Telecommunications Act, a de-
cision on such award requires a prediction of the impact on the
relevant market and hence on the operators in this market, that
is to say Dl, D2, El, and E2.
The two operators, El and E2, were given a considerably
larger amount of spectrum than DI and D2 (22.5 MHz/ 12.5
MHz) when the E2 license was granted in spring 1997 on ac-
count of the prevailing competitive situation. That decision was
based on extensive competitive and technical studies and investi-
gations. These analyses are now being looked at with a view to
determining the extent to which the competitive conditions
have since changed.
When the review is completed, the Regulatory Authority will
decide on the award. The legitimate interests of the parties will
be taken into account, particularly in view of future development
potential. The main criterion for the decision will be ensuring
equal opportunity and thus efficient competition. The key ele-
ments on the spectrum award for mobile applications based on
the GSM standard, were introduced to interested circles by way
of a public hearing as provided for by Section 11 (1) of the Tele-
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communications Act and invited comments.
16
Requiring the regulator's special attention are the new tech-
nologies underpinning UMTS ("Universal Mobile Telecommu-
nications System"), Wireless Local Loop, global satellite commu-
nications networks, and broadband Integrated Service Digital
Network ("ISDN"). By following the principles of openness,
transparency, interoperability, and security, standardization in
these areas aims to avoid discrimination between providers.
Meanwhile, there is agreement at ETSI on the air interface.
From the regulator's point of view, this agreement is greatly wel-
come in the interests of rapidly bringing efficient, innovative
technologies to market. More assignments can be expected
shortly, following the first frequency assignments in 1997-lim-
ited in the first instance to one year-for companies operating
local experimental UMTS networks.
The course will also have to be charted for the introduction
in 2002 of commercial UMTS service. It is hoped that this inno-
vative technology, a facilitator primarily of multimedia applica-
tions, will quickly repeat the success of the GSM standard. If it
does, then it will demonstrate for the interested public how
rapid, far-sighted regulatory measures can encourage innovation
and create new, competitive markets.
Spectrum assignment for Digital Audio Broadcasting
("DAB") is also on the agenda. A decision was taken in mid-
August on the award procedure, the result of extensive public
consultation on the contract documents and a poll of the /ander
on the timescale and regional zones. The green light for appli-
cations submission was then given in late August. In straightfor-
ward cases of single applications, the first licenses were sched-
uled for award in late October.
Digitization, moreover, impacts on all license applications.
It allows vastly more channels in existing frequency bands, so
that arrangements will be required to give program providers
balanced, non-discriminatory access.
B. Universal Service
The Regulatory Authority's job in universal service is to en-
sure the provision of a minimum set of telecommunications serv-
16. Official Gazette No. 25/1998 of December 23, 1998.
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ices. These services have a specified quality and must be avail-
able to all users, independent of where they work or live, at an
affordable price. At present, they comprise ISDN, voice teleph-
ony, directory information, provision of telephone directories,
public telephones with emergency calling facilities, and a set of
leased lines.
It is assumed as a general rule that, in competitive markets,
the above will be provided anyway. Hence the regulator need
only intervene if gaps in supply are identified. Such intervention
could either be through the regulator obliging the dominant
company to provide the service, or by inviting bids for its provi-
sion. The company requesting the least financial compensation
for doing so, or the dominant company would then be required
to provide the service. Any deficit incurred by the provider
would then be offset by means of a levy from all licensees with a
share of more than four percent of the relevant market.
Given the satisfactory supply situation at present, no one is
currently obliged to provide universal services. The sole require-
ment in this connection is that Deutsche Telekom AG notify the
regulator one year in advance of any changes in the conditions
under which it currently provides universal services voluntarily.
1. Additional Notes and Examples
In this connection, the regulator will have to monitor what
the local authorities charge for public telephone locations. A
consensus between the telephone companies and the local au-
thorities should be envisioned in which the latter did not raise
any charges for low-use sites, with a view to safeguarding the in-
frastructure. Fees from lucrative locations should be used to co-
finance such low-use sites, although the fees charged should only
be moderate. This method is the only way to prevent the net-
work of public telephones from being thinned out too greatly.
To this end, standard agreements have been drafted be-
tween Deutsche Telekom AG and leading local authority associa-
tions for use when contracts are negotiated between Deutsche
Telekom AG and local or regional authorities about the opera-
tion of public phones in public places or municipal properties.
The first contract of this kind has been signed by Deutsche
Telekom AG and the city of Cologne.
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C. Rates Regulation
Rates proposed by dominant companies for transmission
lines and voice telephony must be approved by the Regulatory
Authority before they can take effect. The rationale is to prevent
a dominant company from disadvantaging its customers by vir-
tue of its position of strength. One such disadvantage would be
if the company asked for excessively high prices in areas where it
was not exposed to significant competition. Additionally, a dom-
inant company should not be able to restrict its competitors' op-
portunities on account of its position. Such a restriction would
exist, for example, if it were able to drive competitors out of the
market by a policy of unjustified predatory pricing.
The following areas are subject to rates regulation:
" The voice telephony service and leased lines of dominant
companies, i.e., Deutsche Telekom AG's former monopo-
lies, are regulated on an ex-ante basis, that is to say, prices
apply only after approval by the Regulatory Authority.
This regulation also applies to services directly related to
the provision of voice telephony, such as preselection, the
choice of another carrier on an enduring basis.
" For dominant companies, ex-ante rate regulation is also
incorporated in the legislation on interconnection and
special access on account of the great importance of these
issues for the development of efficient competition.
" The other areas are subject to ex-post control of anti-com-
petitive practices. This control enables the Regulatory
Authority to scrutinize prices after their introduction for
any anti-competitive practices such as predatory pricing
or discriminatory behavior. The rates regulation regime
is intended to take account of the pace of development in
the market. Accordingly, decisions on approval must be
taken as quickly as possible. The Regulatory Authority's
Ruling Chambers are required by the Telecommunica-
tions Act to make their decisions within a ten-week pe-
riod.
The principles and procedures of rates regulation are set
forth in Sections 24 to 31 of the Telecommunications Act. Par-
ticularly important is Section 24(1) of the Telecommunications
Act, which states that rates shall be based on the costs of "effi-
cient service provision." Under subsection two, rates may not
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contain any mark-ups or discounts, and may not discriminate for
or against individual users, unless there is an objectively justifi-
able reason for doing so. These points will be dealt with in
greater detail later.
Approving rates on the basis of the cost of efficient service
provision for the given service is the normal practice, for the
time being at least. It means that the rates for each service must
be approved individually. Price cap rulings, whereby several
services are grouped in baskets and regulatory targets, set solely
for the average rates of change in the price of these services,
currently apply to specific retail prices only.
Under Section two of the Telecommunications Rates Regu-
lation Ordinance of October 1, 1996 ("Ordinance" or
"TEntgV"),17 the filing companies are required to submit exten-
sive cost statements."a Filings may be rejected on account of in-
sufficient documentation, as stated in Section 2(3) of the Ordi-
nance. Otherwise, the Regulatory Authority must examine the
documentation to establish whether the rates are based on the
costs of efficient service provisions. According to Section three
of the Ordinance, these are the long run incremental costs of
providing the service plus an appropriate amount for volume-
neutral common costs, both inclusive of an appropriate return
on capital employed, to the extent that these costs are required
to provide the offering.
In this examination, the Regulatory Authority must also re-
fer to the prices and costs of comparable competitive markets.
This reference is specified in Section 3(3) of the Ordinance.
The difficulties of such international comparisons are well
known, but the idea of using international markets for purposes
of comparison is not new in telecommunications. On the con-
trary, it has its origins in general competition law and has proved
17. Telecommunications Rates Regulation Ordinance (TEntgV), v. 1.10.1996
(BGBI. I S.1492(ff)).
18. The statements address the individual costs falling to the given service, and the
common costs allocated on the basis of fixed criteria. These costs must be broken down
into payroll costs, costs in relation to materials, depreciation and cost of capital, all
reflecting the cost of the individual factors employed to provide the service as well as
the relevant prices. Capacity utilization must also be shown. Also required are the ser-
vice specifications, general terms and conditions, revenues generated, quantities sold
and contribution margins. The financial impact of the proposed rates on customers
and suppliers must be depicted. The period to be covered by the statements is the five
years previous to the filing and estimates for the four years thereafter.
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a successful mechanism for the Federal Cartel Office for many
years now. It serves to develop a benchmark for a service for
which there is no competitively determined price. The use of
such a benchmark in specific regulatory rulings is intended
mainly to make products/services and applicable markets com-
parable. A comparison of services must look at criteria such as
technical equipment, quality, and the type and extent of service.
Relevant to a comparison of markets is geographical position,
size of the market, competitive situation, purchasing power of
the population, and regulatory and legislative factors. It will
hardly be possible of course to compare individual services and
markets in all aspects. All the same, we are concerned not to
take an arbitrary approach. Hence it makes sense, and is neces-
sary, to incorporate many services and markets, i.e., countries, in
our comparisons. Such aggregation can then offset specific na-
tional features, and also enable Germany to benefit from the ex-
perience of other countries. Last, stated costs exceeding the
costs of efficient service provision are only taken into account if
they derive from a legal requirement or if there is another
proven objective justification for them.
It was decided in late 1997 that Deutsche Telekom AG
should lower its retail prices for fixed telephony on average by a
minimum of a 4.3% price cap. This ruling was made prior to the
Telecommunications Act and is binding on the Regulatory Au-
thority. The target of an average 4.3% cut stems from an as-
sumed productivity gain of six percent less an inflation rate of
1.7%. Therefore, in January 1998 the Regulatory Authority only
had to establish whether Telekom's price cut effective March 1,
1998 would be within the target. The examination showed that
this was the case and that the reduction was even slightly higher
than the target set. Approval was therefore given.
Yet much more crucial than an imposed ruling will be-and
is already, in many segments-the pressure put on prices as a
result of the ever greater span of competition. This pressure is
not a legislative flaw, but a development fully in line with our
philosophy of market liberalization. Thus, it is indeed worthy
asking whether Deutsche Telekom AG is well advised to limit its
price reduction to just over the required minimum. This is not,
however, a question for the Regulatory Authority but one which
the workings of the market will answer.
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1. Additional Notes and Examples
Not subject to voice telephony regulation is Internet teleph-
ony. Its packet-based transmission of data means that real-time
transmission of voice, as provided by voice telephony, cannot be
assured. It would seem somewhat doubtful whether the advan-
tages of this cost structure, as compared with those of the tradi-
tional providers, can be maintained in the medium and long
term. In the long run, the prospects for Internet telephony lie
in its better potential for integrating different communications
services. Envisaged is the integration of videoconferencing,
mailboxes, pagers, fax, and e-mail, and the goal is to incorporate
telephony in the existing information services offered on the
World Wide Web. In other words, today's price advantage will
be tomorrow's qualitative edge.
D. Rulings on Rates Proposals
The first rulings in 1997 under the rates regulation regime
addressed interconnection charges. The orders issued focused
on the level of interconnection charges payable to Deutsche
Telekom AG. The relevant decisions were made on September
12 and October 2, 1997 by the former Ministry of Posts and Tele-
communications (or "Ministry"). In its rulings on the fees, the
Ministry proceeded with great caution. The lack of detailed
Telekom cost statements made an international comparison nec-
essary. The countries chosen for the comparison were ones with
similar economic and social systems to those of the Federal Re-
public and with deregulated telecommunications markets, spe-
cifically the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Spain, Australia, Japan, Finland, and the United
States. The inclusion of ten countries provided a broad basis
ensuring that the special features of the German telecommuni-
cations market and the situation of Deutsche Telekom AG as a
company exposed to wide-ranging competition for the first time
after decades of monopoly operation would be taken into
proper account. A smaller scale comparison of, say, the three
best-practice countries was therefore passed over. A corridor
ranging from 1.8 Pf/min (average of the top three countries:
United States, United Kingdom, and France) and 3.49 Pf/min
(average of all ten countries contemplated) was established from
which an average was then derived and rounded up to 2.7 Pf/
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min. This amount represents 79.12% of the price level re-
quested by Deutsche Telekom AG as the respondent, without
the access deficit charge being taken into account. The German
prices are within the Commission's recommended range of in-
terconnection charges, albeit at the upper end. The European
Union intends to revise its recommendation downwards in 1999.
This revision means that some of the German prices will then
exceed the proposed ceilings, necessitating a fresh review of the
charges.
Deutsche Telekom AG's preselection charges (choice of car-
rier on an enduring basis) and their coverage in the press caused
customers considerable confusion in early 1998. The relevant
Ruling Chamber pointed out in a communication to Deutsche
Telekom AG that no fees were to be charged for preselection or
number porting ahead of approval. Deutsche Telekom AG was
nevertheless required to provide the service. After Telekom had
withdrawn its initial rates proposal, the Ruling Chamber on June
15, 1998 gave partial approval to the preselection fees filed by
Telekom in a fresh proposal. Starting from the applicable
amount of DM27 in 1998, there was to be a two-stage reduction
at year's end. It will be down to the target price of DM10 as of
January 1, 2000. Given the considerable doubt about Telekom's
efficiency in providing the service, this amount was fixed based
on cost studies and prices in comparable markets in the United
States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. In April, the Ruling
Chamber had already decided that porting, required when a cus-
tomer switches fully to another operator and keeps their
number, must remain free of charge for the user.
On account of widespread complaints about the fifteen per-
cent increase in broadband cable prices introduced by Deutsche
Telekom AG in November 1997, the Regulatory Authority or-
dered formal proceedings into the abuse of a dominant position.
These did not give rise, however, to any objection to the price
increase before the end of 1998. Yet they did show that Telekom
needed to improve its efficiency in this area considerably. The
Ruling Chamber established that the costs it had approved
should be reduced by seven percent by year's end. Deutsche
Telekom AG was therefore ordered to cut its price increase by a
minimum of sixty-four percent by January 1, 1999. It was in-
formed that this order would be enforced by means of a prohibi-
tion order, if necessary. Yet the Regulatory Authority did indi-
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cate that the case could come up for review in early 1999, should
new facts become available in the meantime.
In respect to various other rates, complaints about anticom-
petitive practices by Deutsche Telekom AG have been and are
still being received. For instance, Telekom has been ordered to
grant its competitors access to its in-house cabling facilities in
line with their actual requirements. Preliminary investigations
are still underway concerning complaints from several program
providers about Telekom's increased charges for feeding pro-
grams into its broadband cable network.
E. Network Access and Interconnection
To ensure that new entrants have the same opportunities as
incumbent operators, dominant companies are required by law
to give competitors access to their networks. Additionally, they
must provide access to all the essential facilities they use inter-
nally and supply in the marketplace, on a basis of non-discrimi-
nation, and on the same terms and conditions as they apply to
themselves when using these facilities. And they must provide
the offer in such a way that competitors are not required to take
any services they do not want.
Also vital to the success of any competitive telecommunica-
tions market is that each subscriber can reach any other sub-
scriber in a public telecommunications network. Every operator,
irrespective of its market power, is therefore obliged to negotiate
interconnection arrangements with other operators. If these pri-
vate negotiations fail, the regulator then steps in to order inter-
connection, stipulating solutions to disputed points concerning
the extent of service and fees payable.
In this connection a ruling was made in 1997, before the
market was fully opened, fixing an average connection charge of
2.7 Pf/min. Along with the ruling granting new entrants unbun-
dled access to the Telekom local loop it helped to create a
timely, clear, and predictable environment for competition.
This situation set the stage for the rates Telekom charges its
competitors for access to the local loop to be examined based on
the cost statements submitted. Telekom's first filing was rejected
by the Ruling Chamber on March 9, 1998 on the grounds of
incompleteness and poor verifiability. A provisional fee of
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DM20.65 was mandated for the basic variant, the straightforward
copper pair without any switching.
This temporary order marked an important step in Ger-
many for competition at the local level. Even by international
standards, a high degree of market opening was thereby
achieved. In its renewed filing of September 21, 1998, Deutsche
Telekom AG requested a fee of DM47.26. This filing is based on
a greatly modified, more detailed cost accounting system.
Before reaching a final decision, we will deal with this issue ex-
haustively.
Thirty interconnection agreements, effective at the begin-
ning of the year, have been concluded between Deutsche
Telekom AG and its competitors and provisionally approved by
the regulator. Telekom is currently negotiating with some sev-
enty other companies on interconnection arrangements. Not
yet definitively settled is the matter of exactly what technical re-
quirements an interconnection partner's network should meet
and the number and geographical distribution of the points of
interconnection. Despite these problems, Telekom has agreed
to continue negotiations with these companies and to resolve
disputes by way of conciliation procedures.
Also in this connection, the Regulatory Authority has had a
general model drawn up by the Scientific Institute for Commu-
nication Services ("WIK") for pricing the local network. The
model's assumptions and calculation methods were discussed
with all interested operators in a public consultation. A software
version of the model was made available at year's end. The
model has been extended to the long-distance network, provid-
ing a benchmark with which to assess the costs of various essen-
tial facilities.
International experience has shown that rigorous but fair
cost benchmarks can markedly lower interconnection charge
levels and give telecommunications companies the sound basis
they need for investment planning.
F. Assessment of the Competitive Situation Today
After a 125-year monopoly, it would be an illusion to believe
that the transition to competition would be perfectly smooth.
All concerned, including Deutsche Telekom AG, made enor-
mous efforts to make competition possible on January 1, 1998.
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And the German regulator intervened rapidly, effectively, and in
an entirely consistent manner against attempts to make the
move to new providers unattractive on account of high switching
fees. Yet the area where competition is currently fiercest is not
affected by the switching fees at all: since the beginning of 1998,
every telephone customer in Germany can opt for whichever
provider they wish, free of charge, simply by dialing the appro-
priate carrier code.
Thus, overall, the first year of liberalization can be assessed
entirely favorably. Admittedly, not all the offers we anticipated
have actually materialized. But companies are now vying for the
attentions of residential customers, too, in the long-distance
market. A notable contributory factor to this development has
been the systematic regulation of interconnection charges.
Smaller providers with, initially, only few facilities of their own
have rapidly carved out a niche for themselves in fixed-line te-
lephony. Encouraged by this success, many are now expanding
their network. Thus to date, the regulator has successfully coun-
tered the threat of a few major suppliers operating across the
country at a high cost to the customer.
Price competition will continue to drive the expansion of
the infrastructure, innovation, and technological advance. But
the customer is also being wooed with the arguments of quality
and the availability of innovative services. The mobile pic-
turephone is just one outstanding example from a host of
others.
Concern has been publicly voiced that the regulator's rul-
ings could lead to a reluctance to invest in network infrastruc-
ture and to a lack of innovation as a result of relatively low price
levels for interconnection. Nothing more than price competi-
tion had been launched. Investing in new network technologies
would not be worthwhile, and the incentive for research and
new technological development was inadequate. This reluc-
tance would inevitably result in job losses. At this point it must
be stated explicitly that we are not interested in ruinous price
competition either. From what we see so far, however, there has
been fierce, but not ruinous, price competition. Price and inno-
vation competition are not incompatible; in an environment of
healthy price competition, players need innovation in order to
lower their costs. They also need innovation to be able to tap
new markets and to stand out favorably against their rivals. Nev-
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ertheless, the Telecommunications Act does give us the possibil-
ity of responding to new developments and of ruling out or elim-
inating undesirable effects. And here we take our role as regula-
tor very seriously indeed. The fact that we have taken up the
issue of "switchless operators" and made it the subject of a public
hearing clearly illustrates this. As you know, we consider the
matter of facilities-based competition and whether we need to
adjust and introduce variable interconnection charges to be of
central importance. But we should also like to make clear that
excessively high charges for interconnection and renting the lo-
cal loop cannot be in Telekom's interests either. It would then
soon be faced with rivals undercutting its prices for interconnec-
tion service at the long-distance level, and it would also lose ac-
cess to some, at least, of its end users.
VI. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION: BENEFITS
FOR THE CUSTOMER
As we have said, since the beginning of 1998, every tele-
phone customer in Germany can choose, free of charge, the pro-
vider they wish to handle their call simply by dialing the relevant
code. There are currently some fifty telephone companies offer-
ing this service. The fierce price competition, at long-distance
level in particular, has already paid dividends for the customer.
In some areas, prices have fallen by sixty percent and there is no
indication of this downward trend ending. For example, the av-
erage price per minute for long-distance calls in May 1998, week-
days, during business hours, was between 56 and 20 Pf, depend-
ing on the provider, and between 27 and 10 Pf in the evenings
and at weekends.
Contrary to expectations prior to the launch of competi-
tion, these price reductions are by no means for the benefit of
business customers alone. To a large extent, it is the residential
and small business customers, a suitable target group for the call-
by-call option, whose changed telephony habits are underpin-
ning the success of the new entrants. Many a new company's
business plan has had to be completely overhauled in the light of
this.
There have also been substantial improvements in consum-
ers' rights vis-a-vis telecommunications service providers. For in-
stance, the Telecommunications Customer Protection Ordi-
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nance ("TKV") of December 11, 1997,19 entitles consumers
under Section 14 to an itemized bill and under Section 15 to a
single bill, which also incorporates the services of other provid-
ers used, from the access network operator. In the case of objec-
tions to the bill, the onus of proof is now on the operator, and
no longer the customer (cf. Section 16). Barring is only possible
when the customer defaults on the payment of a minimum of
DM150 (cf. Section 19). And customers may refer disputes with
their provider to the regulator for settlement (cf. Section 35).
As expected, medium-sized and large companies are now of-
fered a raft of customized services to meet their own specific re-
quirements, leading in turn to substantial cost savings and ser-
vice enhancements. In many cases, these reduced costs are
opening up entirely new fields of business, for instance in dis-
tance learning, or facilitating better service, say, through the es-
tablishment of call centers.
Summing up then, it is true to say that innovative products
and services are being made available to all groups of customers
at a considerably more rapid pace than before the advent of lib-
eralization.
VII. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION: BENEFITS
FOR COMPANIES WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
In a monopoly artificially protected from the rigors of the
world market, with no incentive for innovation, where efficiency
gains are not an imperative, and with no pressure on prices, tele-
communications-just like the national coal industry and the
shipbuilding industry in the past-would degenerate into a sub-
sidy-dependent sector, devoid of prospects.
But instead, liberalization has created an entirely new eco-
nomic sector in Germany: the telecommunications industry. It
has spurred the fledgling companies that have enjoyed remarka-
ble success right from the beginning. Even if one or the other
business strategy will fail, we then may nevertheless assume that
the new entrants overall will post a disproportionately large
share of the market in the next few years and that many of their
investments-some of which are substantial-will prove profita-
ble.
19. Telecommunications Customer Protection Ordinance (TKV), 11.12.1997
(BGBI. I S.2910).
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Deutsche Telekom AG, the incumbent, is also benefiting
considerably from the larger market. Competition is encourag-
ing it to streamline its operations and allowing it to set a fast
pace of innovation, financed by private capital. This process is
enabling it as one of the major global carriers to play its proper
part in globalization and in the evolution of the information so-
ciety. To do so, it must focus on five core tasks: a clear strategic
reliance on its core competencies, a radical restructuring of per-
sonnel and operations, reducing its network infrastructure costs,
greater product innovation, and greater applications of diversity
along with a prudent internationalization of its business.
VIII. TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION: BENEFITS
FOR GERMANY AS A PLACE TO DO BUSINESS
The lower cost of communications today, driven down by
competition, and the availability of high quality and even wholly
new kinds of service are boosting competitiveness and employ-
ment prospects in other branches, too. Telecommuting is being
introduced and medium size and large companies are consoli-
dating their distribution and after sales service in so-called call
centers. Call centers alone are expected to provide 140,000 new
jobs by the year 2000. This dynamic development is spreading
far beyond the telecommunications sector. It is eminently im-
portant in terms of Germany's suitability as a place to do busi-
ness and hence for the development and future of the German
economy generally.
Only in a competitive environment can the potential of
communications and information technology unfold in the man-
ner required by economic and social policy generally.
CONCLUSION
The first year of liberalization can thus be assessed entirely
positively. All concerned, Telekom too, did their utmost to get
competition up and running for the 1998 deadline. The fierce
price competition is spurring new technology, for instance in the
field of least-cost-routing. Yet price, particularly in the long
term, will not be the sole measure of competition. Customer-
friendliness, quality, and the availability of innovative services
will become increasingly important factors.
The Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and
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Posts seeks to ensure easy access to the German market and a
level playing field for all, based on regulation that is independ-
ent and quick to intervene against any abuse of market power, in
other words to ensure a sound and predictable investment cli-
mate. Our regulation aims to promote competition in the tele-
communications sector and to encourage technological and or-
ganizational progress at the same time.
This policy stands to benefit all: customers, Deutsche
Telekom AG, new entrants, the workforce, Germany as a place to
do business, and the prospects of the German economy gener-
ally. The World Trade Organization estimates that a quarter of
all economic activity in the industrial countries will be accounted
for in the future by electronic commerce. Germany is preparing
itself for these global challenges and has already made a promis-
ing start. The excellent outlook on the communications and in-
formation technology markets is one of the main reasons why
the economic situation in Germany has markedly improved in
recent months. The 3.8% growth rate in real terms in the first
quarter of 1998 was the highest rate of growth in Germany since
1991.
S144
